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In The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the Supreme Court's
Philosophy ofScience,' Professor David Crump may have successfully destroyed
the intellectual facade constructed by the Supreme Court in its unfortunate
decisions in Daubert v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 and Kumho Tire Co.
v. Carmichael.3 He has methodically outlined the parameters of scientific
endeavor, explaining the importance of each method of research in a manner that
is understandable to the scientifically challenged, and then persuasively
demonstrated that the incomplete nature of the Supreme Court's doctrinal
adherence to quantitative theory cannot rationally form the sole definition of
"scientific knowledge." 4
As Justices have performed poorly when they have taken on the mantle of
historian,5 Professor Crump demonstrates that judges fare no better when
* Mr. Rice is at professor at the American University Washington College of Law
and Director of its Evidence Project, www.wcl.american.edu/pub/ oumals/evidence/. He
is the author of the casebook EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE (4th ed. 2001), the treatises ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED
STATES (2d ed. 1999) and ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: STATE LAW (2002) and a recent
book entitled BEST KEPT SECRETS OF EVIDENCE LAW: 101 PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND
PITFALLS (2001).
1. 68 MO. L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereafter cited as Crump].
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Because the basic principles announced in Daubert for
the application of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to scientific evidence are also applicable
to technological evidence, references to the Daubert ruling are generally intended to be
applicable to the Kumho Tire decision as well.
4. In the Daubert opinion, the Court defined scientific knowledge in terms of
"whether it can be (and has been) tested. 'Scientific methodology today is based on
generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this
methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry."'
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (quoting ERIC D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS,
CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 645 (1983)).
5. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION
300-13 (1988) (stating bluntly that "the Court has flunked history" and that the "judges
exploit history by making ... it yield results that are not historically founded"); Alfred
H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 122-25
(1965) (commenting on how Supreme Court Justices practice "law-office history," a
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pretending to be scientists. Indeed, in Professor Crump's colorful language,
under the deficiencies of the Court's dysfunctional test, courts seem to have been
encouraged to "eat the television set and watch the orange."6
Professor Crump suggests that the decision on the admissibility of scientific
expert testimony is really nothing more than a logical relevance decision,
balanced against the potential for unfair prejudice. This is a proposition with
which no one would disagree.7 In the Daubert opinion, the Court acknowledged
that relevance "provides the baseline" for the admissibility of scientific
evidence,8 but it construed Rule 702 as placing other limitations on the
admissibility of scientific evidence. Rule 702 directs that scientific expert
testimony is admissible if the witness's "scientific... knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."9 From
this language the Court defines "science" and "knowledge" as ideas that are
"ground[ed] in the methods and procedures of science"'0 and known to be true
or inferred from facts known to be true, and accepted as true on good grounds. "
"selection of data favorable to the position being advanced without regard to or concern
for contradictory data or proper evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered");
Edward C. Walterscheid, The Use and Abuse of History: The Supreme Court's
Interpretation of Thomas Jefferson's Influence on the Patent Law, 39 IDEA 195, 197
(1999) (demonstrating, through an examination of Thomas Jefferson's influence on the
field of patent law, how the Supreme Court's use of history is often "incomplete, over
selective, misleading, and biased").
6. See Crump, supra note 1, at 41.
7. This is the balancing approach that has been advocated by Professor McCormick
in EVIDENCE 363-64 (1954) and Professor John W. Strong in Questions Affecting the
Admissibility ofScientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L. FORUM 1 (1970).
8. "We interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would
any statute.... Rule 402 [which makes all relevant evidence admissible unless otherwise
excluded by a specific rule] provides the baseline." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587 (citation
omitted).
9. FED. R. EvID. 702. When the Daubert opinion was written, Rule 702 provided
that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise." Id.
After the Daubert decision, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence added the following clause to the end of the rule: "if (1) the testimony is
sufficiently based upon reliable facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case." Id. This was intended to be a codification of the
principles outlined in the Daubert opinion.
10. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
1i. While the Court's reasoning is logical, it appears to have been constructed from
whole cloth. When Rule 702 was promulgated, it was designed to accomplish two
objectives. First, to lower the standard from "necessity" to simple relevance. Second,
[Vol. 68
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Therefore, as the Court further explains, "in order to qualify as 'scientific
knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific
method."'" This ensures that the science is valid, therefore meeting evidentiary
standards of reliability. This, the Court insists, requires that the testimony "be
supported by appropriate validation, i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is
known."' 3 Later the Court explains that this ordinarily requires that the principle
or methodology has been appropriately validated through testing, independent
peer review, assessment of the rate of error, and ultimately, whether it is
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.
to codify the broad range of means by which the necessary expertise can be acquired.
The language cited by the Court was not intended as an indirect means of
establishing a substitute for the Frye "general acceptance" test that regulated onlythe use
of novel scientific evidence. Despite the increasing concerns about the Frye test, there
is not a single word in either the rule or its legislative history to even suggest that the
purpose of Rule 702 was to refine standards for the admissibility of everytype of science,
all technology, and any other conceivable areas of speciality, simply by the use of the
word "knowledge." Both the structure and language of the rule reinforce the conclusion
that the rule was only codifying the status quo. As written, the clause "scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge" does not appear to be a restriction on the type
of knowledge that must be possessed, as much as a universal way of expressing the range
of areas in which witnesses can have special expertise. In contrast to the Court's strained
interpretation and use of this language, it is far more probable that the clause was
designed only to regulate how one can qualify as an expert (from "knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education"), and when expert testimony is admissible (when it
"will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue").
In reality, the Court has done little more than engage in common law rule-
making-a right that Congress took away from judges when the Federal Rules of
Evidence were codified. When Supreme Court Justices want to change the rules, they
should be required go through the cumbersome and unresponsive Advisory Committee
process that the rest of us are compelled to tolerate. Perhaps then the flawed process
would be changed. For a discussion of the inadequacies of the Advisory Committee
process, and particular problems with the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee,
see generally Paul R. Rice, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Tending to the Past and Pretendingfor the Future?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 817 (2002); Paul
R. Rice & Neils-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee:
A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678 (2000); Paul R. Rice, Rule
Changes Raise Questions, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 13, 2000, at A20; Paul R. Rice, Expert
Overhaul Needed: Outdated Federal Rules Require More Than Judicial Tinkering,
LEGALTIMES, Jan. 31, 2000, at S 1; Paul R. Rice, Bring on the Reformers: Evidence Code
Cries Out for More Than Cautious Tinkering, LEGAL TIMES, October 19, 1998, at 28;
Paul R. Rice, "Good Enough" Is Not Good Enough for Evidence Rules, letter to the
editor responding to article by Professor Capra, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 2, 1998.
12. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 593-94. Theoretically Daubert converted the exclusive "general
acceptance" standard of Frye to a factor to be considered by the presiding judge.
2003]
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Professor Crump parts company with the Court when it imposes what he
believes to be an overly restrictive definition of "scientific knowledge" on the
scientific validation and relevancy determination. Because Rule 702 requires
judges to decide questions of admissibility only on whether proffered opinion
evidence would "assist" jurors in understanding the evidence that has been
presented or determining a fact in issue, he argues that the Supreme Court's
limitation of the definition of "science" to the quantitative method is too
restrictive. His argument is persuasive, and particularly compelling because the
Daubert opinion expanded the judicial screening responsibility from novel
scientific principles and methodologies (the limit of the previously controlling
Frye "general acceptance" test) to all expert scientific testimony. 5
When the previously controlling Frye standard was followed, after general
acceptance was demonstrated, and the science was no longer considered novel,
judges determined admissibility by the Crump standard, "logical relevance
balanced against potential unfair prejudice." Therefore, by recommending that
admissibility be determined on purely logical relevance grounds, Professor
Crump is actually advocating nothing new. He simply wants to get back to
basics-a giant step backwards, if you will, to the pre-Frye way of determining
the admissibility of all evidence. The only difference, which makes his proposal
more compelling today, is the fact that the standard for the admissibility of all
expert testimony has been lowered. Now the testimony need only be helpful. 6
Aside from his critique of the majority's definition of "science," what
Professor Crump seems to be arguing is not much different from what was
argued by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his prescient dissent. He thought that
15. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The District of Columbia
Circuit imposed a "general acceptance in the relevant scientific community" standard for
the admissibility of all novel scientific evidence. Id. at 1014. Subsequently, the Frye
standard was adopted throughout the country, and remained the controlling standard for
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence in literally every state and federal
jurisdiction until the Daubert decision. In Daubert, the Court stated:
Although the Frye decision itself focused exclusively on "novel" scientific
techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specifically
or exclusively to unconventional evidence. Of course, well-established
propositions are less likelyto be challenged than those that are novel, and they
are more handily defended. Indeed, theories that are so firmly established as
to have attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of
thermodynamics, properly are subject toj udicial notice under Federal Rule of
Evidence 20 1.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.1 1.
16. Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, testimony is admissible if
it would "assist the trier of facts to understand the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 702. By
contrast, the common law, under which Frye was created, required the expert testimony
to be "necessary" to thej urors' understanding ofthe evidence or their ability to accurately
resolve a factual issue.
[Vol. 68
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general observations about the parameters of "science" and "knowledge" were
not necessary in order to decide the questions before the Court, and cautioned
that when judges delve into "matters far afield from the expertise of judges,"
their "reach can so easily exceed [their] grasp." Subsequently, his admonitions
were bome out in the utter confusion that has resulted from judges attempting to
use the four illustrative factors as "technical hurdles" or "tests to be rigorously
surmounted" rather than flexible criteria. 7 Neither Chief Justice Rehnquist nor
Professor Crump wants to provide details on how reliability is to be
assessed-leaving that determination to a case-by-case assessment based on
underlying logic of relevance and unfair prejudice.
As noted above, the "scientific knowledge" overlay was created by the
majority in Daubert because of the language of Rule 702. However, in the
process of wrapping themselves in the cloak of "scientific knowledge," simply
because the nature of evidence under discussion was scientific, the Justices, as
predicted by Chief Justice Rehnquist, lost their bearings. Beyond their strangled
definition of"science," which Professor Crump so effectively debunks, the Court
also lost any semblance of common sense.
The Justices went off on their "scientific knowledge" tangent withoutfull
recognition that science is not-and should not be-used in the courtroom in the
same way that it is used in the laboratory. 8 Scientific truths reflected in
17. See Crump, supra note 1, at 17.
18. While the Court did recognize that the "quest for truth in the courtroom and the
quest for truth in the laboratory" are different, it did so only tojustify stringent standards
of scientific verification and reliability. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97.
Petitioners ... suggest that recognition of a screening role for the judge that
allows for the exclusion of "invalid" evidence will sanction a stifling and
repressive scientific orthodoxy and will be inimical to the search for truth
.... It is true that open debate is an essential part of both legal and scientific
analyses. Yet there are important differences between the quest for truth in
the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions
are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve
disputes finally and quickly. The scientific project is advanced by broad and
wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are
incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance.
Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use, however, in the project
of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment-often of great
consequence-about a particular set of events in the past. We recognize that,
in practice, a gatekeeping role of thejudge, no matter how flexible, inevitably
on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and
innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by Rules of
Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but
for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.
Id. The Court only recognized the difference in the nature of the search. The more
important distinction that the Court failed to recognize was the fact that the laboratory
2003]
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scientific principles are used in scientific research to discover further scientific
truths. Through these discovered truths, additional research is done and more
truths are discovered. Consequently, depending on the context, science will
insist on very high levels of accuracy and reliability (confidence levels). In fact,
most quantitative sciences impose something in the neighborhood of a 95%
is searching for further truths from the scientific truth reflected in the principle being
used, whereas the courtroom is simply trying to use the principle, in conjunction with the
remainder of the evidence in the record, to resolve a dispute by a preponderance of the
evidence. Nothing remotely resembling a scientific truth is being sought.
[Vol. 68
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confidence level.' 9 In evidence parlance, this might be the equivalent of
19. This was illustrated by Professor Allen relative to the analysis in Daubert of
Bendectin and its causal relationship to the plaintiffs injuries.
The plaintiffs in Daubert suffer from limb-reduction birth defects allegedly
caused by their mothers' use of Bendectin during pregnancy. The affirmative
scientific support for their assertion came solely from animal studies and
chemical structural analyses of the chemical. A number of epidemiological
studies of the effect of Bendectin have been done, but none of them found
statistically significant correlations between the use of Bendectin and birth
defects. Undeterred, the plaintiffs offered a reanalysis of the data of the
epidemiological studies by well credentialed experts. In essence, their
argument was that the structure of standard epidemiological studies favors
reducing Type I errors at the expense of making more Type II errors. A Type
I error is an erroneous finding of a causal relationship where there is none
between the drug and birth defects, and a Type II error is an erroneous finding
of no causation. Each of the studies used the standard confidence level of
95%, which means that the chances of erroneously rejecting the null
hypothesis (and thus erroneously concluding that there is a causal link) is less
than 5%. But accepting such a standard increases dramatically the probability
that the conclusion of no causation is false. For example, by one calculation,
even if Benedectin caused a doubling in the rate of birth defects, the
probability that the published studies would have yielded a statistically
significant outcome is less than 20%.
The skewing of mistakes against erroneous findings of causation may
seem odd to lawyers, but is plausible in the context of science. In tests such
as those involving Bendectin, the issue generally is whether the drug causes
a particular result, such as increasing the chances of birth defects. Causation
of this sort is virtually always highly complex, and thus essentially random
outcomes occur relatively frequently making it difficult to sort out the precise
effect of a single variable. This is the standard difficulty of arguing from
correlation to causation. In order to protect against an erroneous finding of
causation, most quantitative sciences have set high standards for their
experiments, such as the 95% confidence level. That data do not meet this
standard, and thus that the null hypothesis is not rejected, does not mean there
is no causal link; it means that this experiment did not find one,j udged by the
95% confidence level. Other experiments may come out differently.
Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 1157, 1164-
65 (1994) (footnotes omitted); see also Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and
Sufficiency ofEvidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy ofAgent Orange and
Bendectin Litigation, 86 N. U. L. REv. 643 (1992).
Professor Allen goes on to explain that this approach to experimentation is driven
by the emphasis on Karl Popper's theory on falsifiability (which the Court in Daubert
adopted in its definition of science knowledge), rather than attempting to verify
hypotheses. The focus of falsifiability is appropriate for science because the concern of
science:
is to get a good approximation of reality over the long run. From that
perspective, erroneous findings that some proposition is supported are worse
20031
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establishing reliability, and therefore admissibility, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Such a burden of persuasion has never before been sanctioned for
determining the admissibility of evidence, even the voluntariness of confessions
in a criminal proceeding.2" Indeed, even when science is used in commercial
endeavors, the level of reliability insisted upon is directly linked to the
consequences of error to life and property. To avoid liability, for example, many
industries probably insist on a much higher standard of reliability than would be
necessary in judicial proceedings where legal responsibility is being determined
by a preponderance of the evidence. While I do not know this to be true, I would
expect that the acceptable error rates of the sciences and technologies involved
in creating grades of concrete and their substitutes are probably much higher than
those involved in the manufacturing of synthetic heart valves. And even the
higher error rates that are generally acceptable for concrete or its substitutes will
likely be much lower when the concrete-like substances are used in the
construction of bridges and overpasses, where defects are more likely to cause
a loss of life.
Because science employed in the courtroom need only "assist" jurors in
coming to a decision by only a preponderance of the evidence, the tolerable
limits of unreliability are much higher. Indeed, the standard for determining the
admissibility of all evidence is preponderance-the judge need only be
convinced, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the elements of the
applicable evidence rules governing admissibility have been established. The
problem that remains unaddressed is how does the preponderance standard for
admissibility relate to scientific evidence after the Daubert opinion, in which
judges have been instructed to weigh the same factors that the scientific
community would weigh, when assessing scientific principles under
consideration?
than conclusions that no significant results were obtained. Erroneous findings
of support would tend to generate belief in the truth of the proposition, which
in turn may infect the research program, whereas erroneous findings of no
support will primarily generate further efforts at falsification.
Allen, supra, at 1166.
As Professor Allen explains, herein lies the problem in using science in the
courtroom. The law admits evidence under a preponderance standard and decides
disputes under the same standard. The law imposes a decisional rule that is:
designed to generate about the same number of erroneous verdicts for
plaintiffs as for defendants.... The law assumes that an erroneous rejection
of the null hypothesis that defendant is not liable (thus erroneously finding for
the plaintiff) is equivalent to an erroneous rejection of the hypothesis that
defendant is liable (thus finding for the defendant).
Id. In other words, the law historically has attempted to scatter the errors, while science
attempts to "reduce the number of false findings." Id.
20. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477,489 (1972).
[Vol. 68
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InDaubert the Court instructedjudges to consider four factors: (1) whether
the principles and methodologies under consideration have been tested; (2) the
results of peer review in professional publications; (3) the potential rate of error;
and (4) whether they have achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community.2 Does this perpetuate the same high standards of reliability insisted
upon by the scientific community?
The Justices might argue that, rather than imposing science's high standards
of validity on the trial judge, the Daubert decision was doing just the opposite.
Because the Frye general acceptance test was being abandoned in Daubert for
a discretionary test to be applied by the presiding judge, the Justices might argue
that their decision relaxed the restrictive scientific standards, rather than
perpetuating them, thereby permitting far more evidence to flow into the trial.22
While this argument may be theoretically accurate, in practical reality it has little
substance.
II. THE GOSSAMER FACTORS OF DA UBERT
While the Daubert decision offered four nonexclusive factors that should
be considered by the presiding judge in screening scientific evidence, it is
unclear how this delineation will help judges move away from reliance on people
in the relevant science (a Frye type approach) when judges generally do not have
the expertise to evaluate and apply them.23
21. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
22. In discussing whether the Frye "general acceptance" test had been assimilated
into the Rules, the Court indicated that both the Rules and the Court's decision were
liberalizing the admissibility of scientific evidence.
The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid "general
acceptance" requirement would be at odds with the "liberal thrust" of the
Federal Rules and their "general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers
to 'opinion' testimony."... Given the Rules' permissive backdrop and their
inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention "general
acceptance," the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is
unconvincing.... That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with,
the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.
Id. at 588-89 (citations omitted).
23. Indeed, the difficulties that trial judges will encounter in fulfilling their
"gatekeeping" role was noted by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion in
Daubert:
I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to
know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory
depends on its "falsifiability," and I suspect some of them will be, too. I do
not doubt that Rule 702 confides to thejudge some gatekeeping responsibility
in deciding questions of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony. But
I do not think it imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to
2003]
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For example, mostjudges employing these factors will have no independent
basis for evaluating the tests that were employed to assess the validity and
reliability of the scientific principles and methodologies in question. Perhaps
minor variations in protocols could produce radically different results. They will
not have the expertise to determine an acceptable error rate, or to measure the
adequacy of the controls that were in place to insure that the principles and
methodologies that were employed produced accurate results. If people in
relevant scientific communities had conducted peer reviews and reported
negatively, it is highly improbable that judges would ignore those reviews based
on their own assessment of the science.
By the time most courts begin considering the fourth factor, general
acceptance, the answer is a forgone conclusion because the relevant community
has already been consulted repeatedly on the first three factors. As a
consequence, more often than not, in its practical application, Daubert will be
little more than Frye in drag. 4 With neither the time nor the ability to perform
this task, judges will simply "retool" Frye by anointing a single expert and
substituting that expert's opinions for the relevant scientific or technological
become amateur scientists in order to perform that role. I think the Court
would be far better advised in this case to decide only the questions presented,
and to leave the further development of this important area of law to future
cases.
Id. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, the
warnings of the Chief Justice were prescient. The factors delineated by the majority have
become immutable hurdles in preliminary screening efforts.
24. PAUL R. RICE, BEST-KEPT SECRETS OF EVIDENCE LAW: 101 PRINCIPLES,
PRACTICES, AND PITFALLS 177 (2001); PAUL R. RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 8.03[B][1] (4th ed. 2001). This conclusion may be
supported by a recent study by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice, Lloyd Dixon & Brian
Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases
Since the Daubert Decision (2001). In Section 5.3 the authors concluded:
The role that general acceptance should play in ajudge's decision to exclude
expert evidence was at the heart of the Daubert decision, and we here evaluate
how this role has changed over time. It is not obvious how Daubert might
have affected the importance placed on general acceptance .... [T]here is
uncertainty a priori about the emphasis judges would place on general
acceptance after Daubert. On the one hand, even though general acceptance
is one of the Daubert factors, an increasing focus on direct examination of the
method underlying the evidence may limit general acceptance's importance.
On the other, general acceptance may be used by judges as a convenient
indicator of reliability and be critical to admissibility.
Id. § 5.3. Discussing the results ofthe study, the authors concluded that "evidence found
not to be generally accepted was, if anything, more likely to be found unreliable after
Daubert than before." Id. In assessing the results of this study, it is important to
remember that admissibility of scientific evidence that was not novel did not require the
judge to assess the degree to which it was generally accepted in the relevant science.
[Vol. 68
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communities. The only differences now are that: (1) the judge's definition of
the relevant scientific community may not be as transparent, (2) Daubert is now
much bulkier dressed in this new garb because judges are applying it to all
scientific evidence, not just to novel scientific principles and technologies, and
(3) judges are now laying out the technical criticisms and concerns of the expert
as if they were their own-in much the same way that some do with the logic of
the opinions drafted by their law clerks.
In an article by Justice Stephen Breyer,2" he acknowledged the degree to
which judges rely on guidance from the scientific community. He discussed the
many ways that judges have managed this gatekeeping function. He noted that
some have appointed specially trained law clerks and special masters. Others
have appointed independent experts, in addition to those presented by the parties.
Still others have appointed a neutral panel of experts. All of these case-
management techniques emphasize the continued importance of the opinions of
those in the relevant sciences. The degree to which experts continue to be
crucial to the screening function accentuates the urgency of this unaddressed
problem of the level of reliability that must be demonstrated and the burden of
persuasion that must be satisfied.
For two reasons, the Daubert decision makes this problem more urgent.
First, as previously noted, the admissibility decision is being made for all
scientific and technological evidence. Second, even if preponderance were
generally acknowledged as the standard of reliability, when judges constantly
have to rely upon experts, who employ a much higher standard of reliability, that
higher standard is inevitably influencing, if not controlling, admissibility
decisions.26
25. Stephen S. Breyer, Science in the Courtroom, ISSUES iN SCi. & TECH., July 1,
2000.
26. The Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee has summarily rejected a
proposal by the Washington College of Law Evidence Project to incorporate an explicit
level of reliability in the expert opinion rules. See THE EVIDENCE PROJECT (Thomas C.
Goldstein ed.), at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/joumals/evidence/. Advisory
Committee members expressed the belief that Rule 104 establishes a preponderance of
the evidence standard for admissibility that is applicable to all rules. See Rice & Delker,
supra note I1, at 710-1I.
The Committee's decision was unfortunate for several reasons. First, there is no
guarantee that the Supreme Court will concur in the conclusion that Rule 104 establishes
a preponderance standard of reliability for scientific evidence since the sciences employ
a much higher level of reliability-something that is often more akin to "beyond a
reasonable doubt." Then we must confront the problem of how to coordinate a
preponderance standard with a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
A decade ago a similar problem arose with regard to the relationship of Rules 403
and 609. Rule 403 generally regulates the standard for the exclusion of relevant evidence
because of potential unfair prejudice. Rule 609 controls the admissibility of prior
convictions for impeachment purposes. The Advisory Committee withdrew proposed
2003]
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Do trial judges understand that negative assessments of principles,
methodologies, and applications by people in a particular science or technology
need to be discounted because they are based on elevated expectations of
reliability?27 Do they have an appreciation of the degree to which those opinions
must be discounted? We don't know the answers to either of these questions,
because the Advisory Committee has conducted no studies of these issues.28 If
judges do not appreciate the limits of scientific and technological assessments,
relevant scientific and technological testimony that could be helpful to the finder
of fact is being excluded. This cannot be avoided if the standard by which
validity and reliability is being measured is not explicitly delineated and the
judges are instructed on how to integrate the lesser standard with the higher
standards being employed by those advising them.29
revisions to Rule 609 that explicitly referred to Rule 403, on the belief that the obvious
relationship would be confirmed by the Supreme Court in Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989). To their surprise, however, the Court did not find
what was so obvious to the Committee. Consequently, a specific reference to Rule 403
subsequently had to be incorporated in Rule 609.
Second, the standard by which scientific testimony is screened is influenced by the
disproportionate impact that such evidence will likely have on lay jurors. As a
consequence, it might be expected that manyjudges believe that a higher standard than
preponderance must be employed when determining the reliability of such evidence.
This, of course, is not known because no studies have been conducted by the Advisory
Committee, and such information is generally not volunteered in the written opinions of
judges-possibly because they understand that the less they say about subjects about
which there is uncertainty, the less likely it is that they will be reversed on appeal. One
of the early lessons that trial judges learn is that in silence, appellate courts assume that
trial courts applied appropriate standards.
27. Clearly, those who conducted the study for the Rand Institute for Civil Justice,
did not understand this distinction. In Section 8.2, where next steps were discussed, they
approached the subject of assessing how well judges are performing the gatekeeping
functions. They noted that:
One promising approach is to assemble panels of experts to evaluate expert
evidence in a sample of cases. The experts would evaluate the reliability of
both admitted evidence and excluded evidence so as to understand how well
the screening process is working. The results of such an evaluation could be
the basis of a report card on how well judges are performing the gatekeeping
function.
Dixon & Gill, supra note 24, § 8.2. This of course, is inaccurate. The result would only
measure how well judges play scientist and make scientific decisions on reliability. Since
that is not the issue, the proposed study would measure nothing particularly relevant to
judges' proper function in judicial proceedings.
28. Apparently, the Advisory Committee has not been as enamored with
quantitative theory as the Supreme Court, since it has seldom used its resources to survey
judicial attitudes and practices.
29. Theoretically, scientific principles that might be considered "junk science" by
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Under Frye, the question of validity and reliability, and therefore of
admissibility, was officially delegated to the scientists. They defined what
"4general acceptance" meant and assessed whether the principle under
examination had achieved it. Of course, each scientific discipline had a different
reliability standard, and each expert, as a representative of a discipline, had a
different perception of "general acceptance." Nevertheless, their conclusions
were accepted at face value by the courts. This, of course, was both the
advantage and disadvantage of the Frye test. Primarily it was advantageous
because it left technical decisions about science to those with scientific expertise.
The disadvantage, of course, was that science in the courtroom was always
behind the curve of scientific discovery, and relevant evidence was being
excluded.
If judges, rather than the scientists, are now expected to make this deter-
mination, the nonscientifically trained judges must be given more direction on
how reliability is to be measured. Until we clarify the gatekeeper's screening
mechanism, the secret password will remain "general acceptance in the relevant
science," and too many admissibility decisions will be as unpredictable and
unfair as commentators claimed they were under Frye.30 But again, the situation
may be significantly worse, because this unacknowledged standard is 'now being
used as the indirect screening standard for all scientific evidence, rather than just
that which is novel.
the scientific community might be sufficiently probative to be helpful in a judicial
proceeding if used with reservation. For example, a scientific expert might testify,
"Scientifically speaking, this principle is junk, and would never be used by us, but it's
good enough for the limited purpose for which you are proposing to use it."
I broached the possibility of this type of testimony with scientists while speaking
on the evidentiary problems in introducing satellite images at a conference entitled "A
View from Space: Digital Earth Applications in Environmental Resources
Management," sponsored by Environmental Legal Information Systems, Washington,
D.C., Jan. 26, 2001. This suggestion received robust laughter because scientists perceive
it as being beyond their expertise to venture an opinion on anything other than scientific
uses.
The term "junk science" was made popular by Peter Huber in his book, PETER W.
HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991). An example
of "junk science" was provided by Justice Stevens in GeneralElectric Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In his concurring
opinion, Justice Stevens stated that "the testimony of a phrenologist who would purport
to prove a defendant's future dangerousness based on the contours of the defendant's
skull" would be considered "junk science." Id. at 153 n.6. It is not clear how the
phrenological testimony in Joiner might have utility despite being rejected in the
scientific community.
30. Strong, supra note 7, at I. For an informative examination of the advantages
and disadvantages of the Frye test, see Symposium on Science and the Rules ofEvidence,
99 F.R.D. 187 (1983).
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III. COMMON SENSE VERSUS SCIENTIFIC ACCURACY
What the exclusively scientific assessment ignores is the possibility that
some uses of evidence can tolerate far less accuracy. Exploring disputed issues
through science is a little like fishing, where the fisherman has the choice of
using a range of different strength lines. When trying to catch small fish, the one
pound test line should be quite adequate. If, however, catching large game fish
is anticipated, usually a line with a much stronger pound test is recommended,
although not essential if the equipment is used with some finesse. Similarly, at
trials where a litigant has offered independent evidence to prove a particular
proposition, and the scientific evidence is being offered to confirm or reinforce
a conclusion that otherwise could have been reached based on the evidence heard
or seen, the lighter pound test line should be adequate. When the scientific
evidence is not the only compelling evidence on the point for which it is offered,
there is little reason for judges to exclude it, even though it might be considered
unreliable, or even "junk,"3 in the scientific community. Because the evidence
only needs "to assist" the finder of fact in order to be admissible, every piece of
scientific evidence should not have to be capable of landing the "big one" before
it is admitted. This is particularly true if the trier of fact is the judge, who, like
the fisherman, may be adept at using the more marginal scientific evidence with
some finesse.
Perhaps the recent decisions on the admissibility of expert fingerprint
comparisons is illustrative. 32 Initially concerned about the unknown error rates
and lack of accepted standards for making comparisons, Judge Pollak admitted
the fingerprints (because all prints are stable and different) as well as the expert
testimony on the various points of comparison. He excluded, however, all expert
opinions on whether the latent print and the print taken from the defendant were
the same. On reconsideration, Pollak reversed himself because the standards of
comparison-the number of points of similarity necessary for an identification-
are apparently far more flexible than he originally was led to believe. On the
issue of the unknown error rate, Pollak was satisfied by the absence of negative
evidence-the fact that "there is no evidence that certified FBI fingerprint exam-
iners present erroneous identification testimony, and, as a corollary, that there is
no evidence that the rate of error of certified FBI fingerprint examiners is
unacceptably high." 3
31. Even the Supreme Court in the Daubert opinion recognized that thejury should
be capable of dealing with "shaky but admissible evidence" if it is properly attacked on
cross-examination and challenged with opposing testimony. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
32. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
33. Id. at 572.
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While the absence of negative evidence could be seen as a questionable way
to qualify a science or technology, perhaps it was appropriate here, where the
court was addressing a type of evidence that had been used worldwide for a
lengthy period of time (thereby providing decades of experience to draw upon),
was regarded as reliable by a diverse cross-section of the communities using it,
was available for visual examination by lay jurors who could readily understand
the evidence and critically evaluate the expert's assessments of the points of
comparison, and the evidence was being used in a prosecution in which it simply
complemented a larger factual pattern establishing the identity of the defendant
(thereby, making a higher potential error rate more acceptable).
IV. THE CONCERN ABOUT OVERVALUATION BY JURORS
Of course, the excuse that has justified the exclusion of relevant and
probative scientific evidence (albeit unaccepted in the scientific community) has
been the fear that jurors will give it disproportionate value. While this is not an
irrational concern, courts seem to have taken it to irrational extremes. While the
directive in Rule 403 to balance probative value against unfair prejudice is often
mentioned in judicial opinions as a final check on the admissibility of otherwise
relevant scientific evidence,34 implicitly this balance is already being made part
of the admissibility decision before that point, because relevant and probative
evidence is being excluded on the basis of elevated scientific standards of
reliability. Therefore, we are left with two questions. The first is whether the
Rule 403 standard is implicitly being factored into the initial screen to exclude
relevant evidence only when the potential prejudice substantially outweighs the
probative value. The second is how are judges concluding that jurors cannot
understand, and therefore will be overwhelmed and led astray by, particular types
of expert testimony?
The unstated potential danger implicitly being infused into the initial screen
standard may be exaggerated. Because of this possibility, perhaps, as Professor
Crump advocates, courts should be encouraged to make admissibility decisions
of scientific evidence only on the basis of logical relevance (Rules 401 and 402)
balanced against unfair prejudice that must substantially outweigh value to
justify exclusion (Rule 403), leaving the technical Daubert factors to the end of
34. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 ("Finally, Rule 403 permits the exclusion
of relevant evidence 'if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. . . .' Judge Weinstein
has explained: 'Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of
the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible
prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more
control over experts than over lay witnesses."') (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of
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trial, after all relevant evidence has been heard and the relative significance of
the scientific evidence is more apparent. This could be accomplished by
tentative rulings when the evidence is initially presented, with a final assessment
when the trial has been completed, or, if tentative rulings are not palatable,
through motions for judgment at the end of the trial (if there is not sufficient
evidence to raise a genuine factual controversy) under Rule 50 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure."
Moreover, rather than assuming thatjurors are going to misuse certain types
of scientific evidence, and keeping so much from them through highly restrictive
screening standards (that are neither well understood nor consistently applied by
the judges who use them), it may make more sense to permit all relevant
scientific evidence to be heard by the jurors that will not obviously distort their
deliberations. 6 If Daubert was intended to liberalize the admissibility of
scientific evidence, in the same way the admissibility of all other evidence has
been liberalized under the Federal Rules of Evidence, this may be the only
effective way that that can be accomplished, given the restrictive attitudes that
have evolved."
Post-trial procedural mechanisms have a number of advantages. First, they
could address the problem of overvaluation by jurors as effectively as pre-
35. If made before the case is submitted to the jury, it would be through the
equivalent of the old motion for a directed verdict. If after the jury has returned a verdict,
it would be through the old motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
36. Of course, this approach would confront special problems in criminal cases
where there must be greater sensitivity to the special vulnerability of the accused, and
there is no possibility of a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict for
the prosecution.
37. In the Daubert decision, the majority recognized how post trial motions could
serve as an effective check on the admission of marginal scientific evidence:
Respondent expresses apprehension that abandonment of "general
acceptance" as the exclusive requirement for admission will result in a "free-
for-all" in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and irrational
pseudoscientific assertions. In this regard respondent seems to us to be overly
pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system
generally. Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence,
and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. Additionally,
in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented
supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude
that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct
a judgment . . . and likewise to grant summary judgment. . . . These
conventional devices, rather than wholesale exclusion under an
uncompromising "general acceptance" test, are the appropriate safeguards
where the basis of scientific testimony meets the standards of Rule 702.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96 (citations omitted).
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admissibility screening. Indeed, they may be more effective, because they will
be decided with a more complete understanding of the value of the science or
technology in the panoply of the evidence presented. A concern that the jury
may give too much weight to the evidence is really a sufficiency of the evidence
issue that should be addressed at the end of the trial, not at the point when the
evidence is offered. When dealt with as an admissibility issue, both the nature
of the remainder of the evidence that will be offered and the mind-set and
abilities of thejurors who will weigh it are far too speculative. Second, post-trial
motions permit the trial to incorporate a broader range of relevant, and therefore
helpful, evidence. Indeed, by encouraging the decision to be made later, judges
may intuitively understand that their decision about scientific evidence is not
purely a scientific one. Third, a jury's willingness to give controlling weight to
a marginally probative science or technology may give important messages to the
affected businesses, even though the jury's actions will not have legal conse-
quence because the judge overturns it.38 If, when the jury's verdict is returned,
the presiding judge concludes that too much weight must have been given to the
marginal evidence, the judge can either grant judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or order that a new trial be held.
With luck, Professor Crump's contribution may be the catalyst for a
complete reassessment of judicial approaches that have evolved over the past
century to the use of expert scientific testimony in the courtroom. I, however,
would not recommend that Professor Crump hold his breath in anticipation of
this. Dislodging entrenched doctrine is a lot like renovating structures in which
people happily reside. Regardless of its obvious need and intrinsic merit, change
is often expensive, always disruptive, and, therefore, usually summarily
dismissed along with its proponents, who are seen as trespassers, or worse yet,
officious interlopers.
38. Of course, as with the admission of all other evidence, there is a possibility that
the presidingj udge (based on the remainder of the evidence heard) may conclude that the
scientific evidence heard by the jury should not have been admitted. If it had been
excluded and the remainder of the evidence would not permit a reasonable jury to
conclude that a particular element of the cause of action were true, a verdict could be
directed. If, despite the elimination of the scientific evidence, a directed verdict for the
opposing side is still not warranted because sufficient other evidence is in the record to
support the claim, the presidingjudge would have to decide if it would suffice to give a
limiting instruction to the jury to ignore the evidence, or whether fairness demands that
a new trial be granted.
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